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Abstract—There is extensive debate in the schooling literature about the failure to control for ability. This 
paper uses two new data sets that include various measures of ability, collected when the respondents 
were between 12 and 13 years old. The measures include scores from intelligence tests, achievement tests 
and school marks. In line with general opinion, the estimated wage premiums for education fall 
considerably when ability is controlled for. The average reduction is around 20 per cent, which is lower 
than comparable figures obtained in the U.S. I also find that measures associated with mathematics are 
the most important ones. 
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I. Introduction 
Economists have long stressed the importance of human capital accumulation for the 
process of economic growth, and at present human capital plays an important role in 
models of endogenous economic growth, e g Barro (1991) and Romer (1990). Lately, 
the discussion in Sweden among politicians and economists has focused on the level of 
economic return to education and its implications for the incentive to go on to higher 
education, see SOU (1993:16) and Konjunkturrådets rapport (1997). 
Since the 1960s, the returns to schooling, estimated by means of conventional 
wage regressions, have decreased from approximately eight per cent in 1968 to four per 
cent in 1991, with the main fall in the early 1970s, see Edin and Holmlund (1995), 
Björklund and Kjellström (1994). Some argue that, compared to other countries, the 
level is too low to attract students to further education, see Henrekson (1992), whereas 
others claim that the return is not extremely low in Sweden, Edin et al. (1993). 
Unfortunately, the magnitudes of the estimated returns to schooling referred to 
in this discussion are potentially biased due to the omission of relevant variables in the 
earnings function. Since factors such as ability are not captured in conventional wage 
equations, the general opinion has been that the estimated return to schooling is biased 
upwards. However, the direction of the bias is impossible to predict from theoretical 
optimization models (see below). 
During the last few decades a number of labour economists have paid much 
attention to the problem of ability as an omitted variable. A number of U.S. studies have 
examined whether changes in ability or changes in the return to ability could to some 
extent explain the change in the return to schooling over time, most notably during the 
1980s in the United States. Despite the fact that the growing importance of ability in 
wage determination is supported by the empirical findings presented in Blackburn and 
Neumark (1993) and Murnane et al. (1995), the increased role of ability can not entirely 
explain the sharp increase in the return to schooling for men that occurred in the 1980s. 
However, Murnane et al. show that including measures of ability in the wage 
equation results in a considerable decline (40 to 50 per cent) in the magnitude of the 
coefficient on schooling. Similar results are reported in two other US studies, Griliches 
(1977), Blackburn and Neumark (1995). They show that including measures of ability 
in the wage equation reduces the estimated return to education by up to 40 per cent. 
Furthermore, Blackburn and Neumark (1992) have also examined the relationship 
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between wages and ability in a number of industrial sectors. Apart from measures of 
ability, they also incorporate the possibility of inter-industry wage differentials in the 
wage equation. The empirical findings, however, indicate that inter-industry wage 
differentials are not chiefly attributable to variation in ability. 
In these studies, unobserved ability is modelled as a latent variable, with 
intelligence tests serving as indicators of ability. Some of these tests were done in the 
last year of high school, whereas some others were done at different ages in connection 
to the surveys. For instance, Griliches (1977), Blackburn and Neumark (1992) report 
two sets of estimates, one using the scores from a high school intelligence test and the 
other using the Knowledge of the World of Work (KWW) test, which examines the 
respondents' knowledge about the labour market. Murnane et al. (1995) uses the scores 
from a test of mathematics skill. Blackburn and Neumark (1993, 1995), in turn, use a 
data set which provides information about the scores from each of the ten components 
of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tests developed to predict 
performance in armed forces training programs. The battery of tests consists of 
achievement tests designed to measure vocabulary, basic science and arithmetic. There 
are also tests of specific vocational skills and tests of numerical and coding operations. 
There are alternative approaches to eliminate ability bias. A common approach 
is to utilize the relative closeness of such unmeasured factors as ability and childhood 
conditions by the use of differences between twins or siblings. For instance, Ashenfelter 
and Krueger (1994) have employed US data for identical twins to study the economic 
return to schooling. In sharp contrast to the general view, they do not find evidence that 
unobserved factors cause an upward bias in the ordinary least squares estimates of the 
return to schooling. They do find that measurement error in education does bias it 
downwards. This approach, however, can be and indeed has been criticized. Hanushek 
(1992) shows that parents appear to act in a compensatory manner. Families want to 
reduce income inequalities between siblings in adult life by sending less promising 
children for further schooling. 
Another problem with twin studies is that the variation in schooling between 
twins is lower than between randomly selected individuals, which in turn aggravates the 
problem of measurement errors. Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) use a 
representative sample of data on fathers, sons and brothers to control for omitted 
variables. They found that controlling for both omitted variables and measurement 
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errors in reported schooling yields results comparable to conventional ordinary least 
squares estimates of the return to schooling. 
A third alternative is the instrumental variables (IV) approach. Angrist and 
Krueger (1991), for instance, exploit the impact of compulsory schooling laws on 
schooling decisions, to create instruments for schooling that are uncorrelated with 
ability. Using quarter of birth as an instrument for education in the earnings function, 
Angrist and Krueger find a remarkable similarity between the IV estimates and the OLS 
estimates of the return to schooling. Thus, the empirical findings differ greatly 
depending upon choice of method.1 
Previous cross-sectional studies in Sweden have, to some extent, attempted to 
control for the effect of unobserved ability on wages. To the best of my knowledge, 
however, explicit measures of ability have only been used in a minority of studies. 
Gustafsson (1990) uses test scores from intelligence tests collected when the individuals 
were between 12 and 13 years old. He finds a relatively small effect of ability on annual 
income when education is controlled for. However, he does not examine the magnitude 
of the omitted ability bias in the schooling coefficient. Instead of test scores from 
intelligence tests, Erikson and Jonsson (1997) use school marks. In conformity with the 
general opinion, their results suggest that the return to schooling is biased upwards. 
Instead of explicit measures of ability, information about various family 
background variables, like father's and mother's occupation and education, have been 
more frequently utilized in the estimation. For instance, once age, marital status, place 
of residence, parental occupation and education dummies are included in the regression, 
the economic return to education falls, Björklund and Kjellström (1994). 
Similar results are presented in Kazamaki Ottersten et al. (1996), who deal with 
three econometric problems associated with the measurement of the return to education: 
omitted variable bias, selection bias and measurement error in schooling. Furthermore, 
instead of family background they use a more general concept: social capital. Their 
main conclusion is that measurement error in schooling is the important problem. A 
similar conclusion is drawn by Isacsson (1997). He employs a sample of twins born in 
Sweden between.1926 and 1958 to correct for omitted ability bias. Correction for ability 
leads in general to lower estimates of the return to schooling, but in conformity with 
1. Card (1995), however, attempts to explain the seemingly contrasting results. 
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Kazamaki Ottersten et al. he found that the results were sensitive to measurement error 
in schooling. 
The purpose of this study is to shed further light on the magnitude and the 
direction of the bias in the estimated return to education in Sweden by exploiting two 
data sets, which previously not have been used to estimate wage equations.2 The data 
sets consist of several measures of intelligence and scholastic achievement collected 
when the respondents were between the ages of 12 and 13. The intelligence tests 
represent the verbal, spatial and reasoning factors of intelligence. School marks and 
scores on national standardized school tests are available in Mathematics, English and 
Swedish. 
The advantage of using test scores obtained in the early part of schooling is the 
similarity in education-related background variables. Thus, in contrast to previous US 
studies age- and education-related ability differentials are of minor importance in this 
study. Neither are the intelligence tests truncated, which could be the case with tests of 
which the main task, after all, are to screen individuals. 
Information on earnings and highest educational level is available when the 
respondents are 40 and 45 years of age, respectively. Thus, another advantage of these 
two data sets is that people have been in the labour force for a while, and most likely 
have finished school. Furthermore, the high reliability of highest educational level in the 
data sets should also be pointed out. 
The paper is organized as follows. The nature of the problem is presented in 
section II. Both theoretical and empirical aspects of the ability-schooling-earnings 
relationship are discussed. Section in describes the data employed. The empirical 
findings are presented in section IV. Sensitivity analyses are given in section V. Section 
VI, finally, summarizes and concludes. 
II. The nature of the problem 
To illustrate alternative sources of bias in the schooling coefficient of an earnings 
equation, I introduce a simple model where ability affects both the returns and the costs 
of education. Similar theoretical frameworks are found in Ashenfelter and Rouse 
(1996), Blackburn and Neumark (1995) and Card (1995). 
2. Gustafsson (1990) uses a data set which basically originates from the same data source, but without 
the same information on highest educational level and earnings. 
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A. The model 
Assume that the individuals seek to maximize utility which, to keep things as simple as 
possible, is a function of earnings (y) and schooling (S) 
U(y(S),S) = \ny(S)-g(S). (1) 
The utility-maximization problem requires that the optimal level of schooling satisfies 
the first order condition, where marginal benefit ( y I equals marginal cost 
(g' (S)) of education. I assume that the marginal benefit of education (MB) for each 
individual (i) is related to both ability (A) and years of schooling (S) 
MB{ = b + kAi-mSi. (2) 
As a consequence of higher productivity, ability and the marginal benefit of education 
are assumed to be positively related. Furthermore, the marginal benefit is assumed to 
decrease with years of schooling, because individual marginal productivity decreases 
with years of schooling. 
Further, let the marginal cost of education (MC) be 
MC. = d + pAt + rSr (3) 
Since individuals with higher ability are likely to have higher opportunity costs 
(foregone earnings) of attending school, but also easier access to scholarships and 
subsidized loans etc., the effect of ability on the marginal cost of education is 
ambiguous. The marginal cost is assumed to increase with schooling, i.e. the financing 
cost rises with years of schooling. 
Equating marginal benefit and marginal cost, the optimal individual level of schooling 
(S ) becomes 
* b-d+ (k + p)A. 
St = f- (4) 
Thus, the influence of ability on schooling depends on the sign of (k + p). 
By integrating the marginal benefit of education (2) over years of schooling, we obtain 
the log earnings of individual (/) 
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]ny. =xi'a + bSi + kAiSi-r?S2i, (5) 
where ability, family background and other earnings-generating factors constitute the 
vector x • = (A., z.)', and represent the values of the initial stock of human capital and 
post school investments etc. 
According to this model, ability contributes both to a variation in earnings at 
all levels of schooling and to a variation in the returns to schooling. This contrasts with 
the majority of previous empirical specifications, which exclude the interaction term 
between ability and schooling, i.e the marginal benefit of education is independent of 
the level of ability.3 However, the specification of the marginal benefit function in 
Blackburn and Neumark (1995), in which utility is defined over earnings in place of log 
earnings, leads to a specification for the log earnings without an interaction term 
between ability and schooling. Instead, ability together with the logarithm of schooling 
entered linearly in the log earnings equation. 
B. Estimation 
There are a number of important econometric issues involved in the estimation of the 
earnings function. These issues are not only restricted to the problem of ability as an 
omitted variable, but also include errors in variables. 
Applying OLS to the earnings function without including ability leads to 
biased estimates of schooling. When schooling is perfectly measured and ability omitted 
from the equation, the direction of the bias is determined by the covariance between the 
two variables. When the optimal level of schooling is determined by equation (4), the 
direction of the bias is ambiguous. Further, if more regressors are added to the earnings 
equation it would be insufficient to determine the direction of the covariance between 
schooling and ability to find out the direction of the bias in the schooling coefficient. 
Thus, the return to schooling is not necessarily biased upwards. 
The situation is even more complicated if schooling is measured with errors. 
Then the coefficient on schooling would be biased toward zero, and the biases could be 
rather severe. Moreover, by adding more variables (ability) that affect income mainly 
via schooling, makes the errors of measurement even worse. As was pointed out by 
3. Blackburn and Neumark (1993), Murnane et al. (1995), however, also present estimates for the speci-
fication with an interaction between ability and schooling. 
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Griliches (1977) "we may kill the patient in our attempts to cure what may have been a 
rather minor disease originally". Thus, the importance of good measures of schooling 
is crucial in the attempt to control for omitted ability bias. 
Despite perfectly measured schooling, correction for ability may still not 
generate consistent estimates of the return to education. The theoretical specification (5) 
includes ability, for which the scales of measurement do not exist or at least is hard to 
measure. Instead, true ability is a latent variable with, for example, intelligence tests and 
achievement tests serving as indicators of ability. Unfortunately, there may be a 
discrepancy between the latent variable that is rewarded in the labour market and these 
indicators. The use of error ridden indicators imply that the OLS estimator is no longer 
unbiased or consistent. 
The instrumental variable (IV) procedure, however, uses the method of 
moments as an estimation principle to generate a consistent, but not necessarily an 
asymptotically efficient estimator, in a situation where a regressor is con-
temporaneously correlated with the error. A legitimate instrument that fulfils the 
restrictions of being both contemporaneously uncorrelated with the measurement error 
of ability and correlated with the regressor for which it is to serve as an instrument, 
would be other measures of ability, see Griliches (1977), Blackburn and Neumark 
(1995). 
In this study some of the available measures of ability are used as error ridden 
indicators, whereas other measures serve as instruments. In the estimations, I allow 
included regressors of ablity with accompanying instrumental variables to alternate 
between the available measures. Furthermore, the existence of measurement errors is 
tested with the Hausman specification test. 
III. Data 
This study is based on two nationally representative samples of pupils born in 1948 and 
1953. These samples are the first and second age cohorts of the Individual Statistics (IS) 
project at the Department of Education and Educational Research, University of 
Gothenburg.4 The first collection of data started in the spring of 1961 and included all 
people born in Sweden on the 5th, 15th and 25th of any month in 1948. The second 
4. see Svensson (1971) and Härnqvist and Svensson (1973) for a more detailed description of the data 
sets and the purposes of the IS-project. 
collection of data, which was a replication of the procedure described above, started in 
the spring of 1966 and included pupils bom in 1953. This implies that the respondents 
were between 12 and 13 years of age at the time of the surveys and the majority were in 
the sixth form of the compulsory school system. The total number of individuals born 
on these specific days was 12,166 in 1948 and 10,723 in 1953. Due to limited resources, 
the drop-out rate is higher for the 1953 cohort. The samples cover 11,950 and 9,927 
individuals, respectively. 
The types of schools attended by the pupils varied at the time of the surveys. 
The Swedish parliament decided to extend compulsory schooling to nine years in 1950. 
A three-or-four-year junior secondary school (realskola) was established up to the sixth 
form of the elementary school (folkskolan). Furthermore, an experimental compre-
hensive school (enhetsskola/försöksskola) was to replace the old elementary school and 
the junior secondary school in some selected municipalities. In 1961,40 per cent of the 
pupils were enrolled in the experimental comprehensive school. 
After a short period of time, the experimental comprehensive school was 
replaced in 1962 by the present 9-year compulsory comprehensive school 
(grundskolan). This new comprehensive school gradually replaced the old school 
system in all municipalities and in 1966, more than 80 per cent of the pupils were 
enrolled in the new comprehensive school. In spite of the fact that there were differences 
in the type of compulsory school at the time of the surveys, the environment was more 
or less identical up through the sixth form. Furthermore, school start was at seven years 
of age in all the systems. 
Three main categories of data were collected in the IS-project The first 
category comprises information from school records such as type of school, form, 
school marks and scores on national standardized school tests (standardprov) in the 
sixth form. The school tests (henceforth called achievement tests) covered Reading, 
Writing, English and Mathematics. In the new comprehensive school, however, the 
achievement tests in Reading and Writing were merged into one; Swedish. Another 
difference between the elementary/experimental comprehensive school and the new 
comprehensive school is the scale of marks. Marks in the elementary/experimental 
comprehensive school were awarded according to a seven-point letter scale and in the 
new comprehensive school according to a five-point number scale. Information on 
marks is available for the following subjects; Mathematics, English and Swedish. 
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The second category of data consists of information from replies to 
questionnaires about the respondents' attitudes to school and spare time interests, and 
also information on parents' attitude to higher education. 
The third category of data consists of the scores from three intelligence tests 
designed especially for the IS-project. The intelligence tests represent the verbal, spatial 
and reasoning factors of intelligence. The tests are called Opposite (choosing the 
opposite of a given word from four choices), Metal folding (finding the three-
dimensional object that can be made from a flat piece of metal from four alternatives) 
and Number series (completing a specific number series). The total test score is 
determined by the number of correctly answered items. The number of items in each test 
is 40 and the pupils have 10, 15 and 18 minutes, respectively, to complete the tests. 
The advantage of using test scores and school marks collected before the pupils 
enter the seventh form, is the similarity in education-related background variables. 
Thus, in contrast to the majority of previous US studies age- and education-related 
ability differentials are of minor importance in these two data sets.5 Neither are the 
intelligence tests truncated which could be the case with tests of which the main task, 
after all, are to screen individuals. Especially, the test scores on Number Series show a 
well-turned distribution. The other two intelligence tests are somewhat skewed to the 
left. 
Information on respondents' highest level of education was obtained from the 
educational register (Utbildningsregistret). The data sets do not include information on 
years of schooling. Instead, educational level was classified according to the Standard 
Classification of Education in Sweden (SUN). I distinguish between seven categories, 
with the highest level of education completed in 1993 as the classifying principle. 
Consequently, I estimate the wage premiums for education and not the internal rate of 
return to education. 
Category 1 (EDI) consists of individuals with less than nine years of education. 
The majority of these have elementary school (folkskola) as their highest educational 
level, but there are also some with an eight-year (experimental) comprehensive school 
5. The influence of sex, education, family size and age on procured ability has been reported in several 
studies, e g Bränberg et al (1990), Hanushek (1992). Thus, test scores of intelligence tests adminis-
tered at different ages may lead to different results. Hanushek also presents some evidence that teach-
ers in the US vary dramatically in effectiveness, resulting in differences in performance between 
students from different classes. A positive relationship between school quality and return to schooling 
is also reported in Card and Knieger (1992). 
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(grundskola) as their highest educational level.6 Category 2 (ED2) comprises 
individuals with nine or ten year of education, i. e. individuals with junior secondary 
school (realskola) or (experimental) comprehensive school as their highest educational 
level. Category 3 (ED3) consists of individuals who attended upper secondary school 
for up to 2 years (kortare gymnasium). Individuals with the same type of education as 
Category 3 but with more than 2 years (längre gymnasium) constitute Category 4 (ED4). 
Category 5 (ED5) is composed of individuals with post secondary schooling of up to 2 
years (kortare universitetsutbildning), while individuals with more than 2 years' post 
secondary schooling (längre universitetsutbildning) constitute Category 6 (ED6). 
Finally, Category 7 (ED7) comprises individuals with a completed doctoral degree 
(forskarexamen). 
In the previous section I have emphasized the importance of adopting high 
quality measured variables. The quality of the 1991 version of the register that I use, has 
been evaluated by Statistics Sweden (1997). The actual data set has been confronted 
with data from a so called "true register". The register referred to is a Swedish Labour 
Force Survey (AKU) sample created in connection to 1990 Census (FOB-90). This "true 
register" makes use of information from both sources. Any mis-matches in educational 
classification in these two sources was further investigated and corrected. 
The proportion individuals correctly classified by educational level was 83 per 
cent. However, one might expect a higher reliability of educational level in the data sets 
that I use. The reasons are, first that the reported numbers on mis-classification also 
include missing observations in the educational register. Thus, the proportion correctly 
classified is higher in samples that only include individuals with available information 
on educational level. Second, since the respondents were enrolled in the Swedish school 
system in 1961 and 1966, respectively, the number of foreign educational degrees is 
small. Thus, both problems associated with classification and missing observations 
should be of minor importance. The proportion of correctly classified individuals by 
educational level born in Sweden is 85 per cent, in contrast to 69 per cent for those born 
outside Sweden. 
Third, the figure of 83 per cent presumes that all information on educational 
levels in the true register really is correct. A more realistic assumption is that both the 
6. Having consulted the local education authority, the pupil could leave the comprehensive school after 
eight years education for alternative education or for appropriate employment. 
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educational register and the true register suffer from measurement error, but of different 
magnitude. Therefore, the proportion correctly classified individuals by educational 
level most likely is higher than 83 per cent. Fourth, the individuals in my samples belong 
to the same age cohort and face more or less the same educational system. Thus, 
classification errors in educational levels due to changes in classification of different 
educations over time would be of minor importance. Fifth and most important, since 
new and better data have become available after 1991, the quality of the educational 
register improves continuously. Officers from Statistics Sweden report marked 
improvement of the whole register. These improvements do not only affect the flow, but 
also existing information in the educational register. Thus, the proportion correctly 
classified in my data sets should be far better than 83 per cent. 
For information on labour earnings, I rely on data for 1993 (ÅRSYS 93) 
provided by Statistics Sweden. The data set consists of information about annual income 
from both employment and self-employment. The information originates from 
companies' returns to the tax authorities (kontrolluppgifter). The Department of 
Education and Educational Research at the University of Gothenburg commissioned 
Statistics Sweden to link and match the data sets. Since I do not have information on 
hourly wage, work experience or working-hours (full-time versus part-time), I have 
restricted my attention to men. I have also restricted the data sets to individuals who 
report positive earnings from work as employed, with the total reported earnings from 
work and from self employment amounted to at least SEK 84,000. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 1. Test scores on 
the intelligence tests are not available for 12.1 per cent of those in the 1948 cohort and 
for 5.9 per cent of those in the 1953 cohort, mainly a consequence of absence from 
school on the days of testing. Test scores on the achievement tests are available for 71.7 
per cent and 81.8 per cent, respectively. The non-response group includes pupils who 
were either not in the sixth form or who were absent from school on the day of testing. 
Finally, school marks in all subjects are available for 94.1 per cent and 96.3 per cent, 
respectively. The non-response group consists mainly of individuals not in the sixth 
form. These restrictions and missing observations reduce the size of the samples to 
3,364 individuals born in 1948 and 3,018 individuals born in 1953. 
Individuals in the (experimental) comprehensive school seem to be more 
successful in both intelligence tests and achievement tests than those enrolled in the 
elementary school. Further, the test measuring the ability to complete a specific number 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Standard deviations in parenthesis and min-max values in brackets. 
1948 cohort 1953 cohort 
Variables 
elementary 
school (1961) 
experimental 
comprehensive 
school (1961) 
elementary 
school (1966) 
comprehensive 
school (1966) 
Intelligence tests 
Opposite 
Valid values: 0-40 
Number Series 
Valid values: 0-40 
Metal Folding 
Valid values: 0-40 
Achievement tests 
Swedish 
Valid values: 0-103 
Reading 
Valid values: 
(a): 7-63, (b): 0-95 
Writing 
Valid values: 
(a): 13-91, (b): 0-109 
English 
Valid values: 
(a): 0-10, (b): 0-98 
Mathematics 
Valid values: 
(a): 10-70, (b): 0-70 
Marks 
Swedish 
Valid values: 
(a): 0-6, (b): 1-5 
English 
Valid values: 
(a): 0-6, (b): 1-5 
Mathematics 
Valid values: 
(a): 0-3, (b): 1-5 
Earnings (1993) 
Earnings in thousands' 
(SEK) 
Valid values: 84 -
Log Earnings 
Valid values: 4.09 -
23.19 
(6.34) 
[6-39] 
20.74 
(7.59) 
[0-39] 
22.20 
(7.24) 
[3-39] 
23.60 
(6.30) 
[5-40] 
21.45 
(7.58) 
[0-40] 
23.31 
(7.25) 
[5-39] 
38.17 
(7.24) 
[14.5-60]" 
51.29 
(9.93) 
[21.5-86.5]" 
5.28 
(1.75) 
[1-9.6]« 
42.56 
(9.47) 
[18-69]a 
3.43 
(0.88) 
[ l -6 ] a 
2.94 
(1.01) 
M " 
3.29 
(1.07) 
[0-6]« 
237.29 
(111.46) 
[84.20-1487.80] 
5.39 
(0.38) 
[4.43-7.31] 
38.48 
(7.28) 
[15-59.5]" 
51.52 
(10.03) 
[16.5-82]" 
5.54 
(1.78) 
[1.2-9.7]" 
42.52 
(9.70) 
[15.5-68.5]" 
3.36 
(0.89) 
[1-5]" 
2.93 
(1.03) 
[0-5]" 
3.21 
(109) 
[0-6]" 
249.18 
(121.04) 
[86.30-1838.10] 
5.44 
(0.39) 
[4.46-7.52] 
23.50 
(6.19) 
[2-38] 
20.38 
(7.89) 
[1-39] 
22.22 
(7.25) 
[3-37] 
24.73 
(6.09) 
[7-40] 
21.77 
(7.75) 
[1-40] 
23.38 
(7.30) 
[1^0] 
55.27 
(15.47) 
[9-99] 
54.75 
(15.40) 
[12-93]b 
61.49 
(15.04) 
[10-106]b 
52.81 
(19.52) 
[8-98]b 
35.68 
(13.16) 
[7-70]b 
3.37 
(0.86) 
[1-*]" 
3.04 
(0.99) 
[1-5]" 
3.30 
(109) 
[1-6]" 
209.92 
(88.97) 
[84.30-1007.40] 
5.28 
(0.34) 
[4.43-6.92] 
-
-
55.15 
(19.89) 
[7-98]b 
37.95 
(13.56) 
[4-68]b 
3.08 
(0.95) 
[ l -5 ] b 
3.10 
(1.02) 
[ l -5 ] b 
3.29 
(1.04) 
[ l -5 ] b 
227.68 
(97.98) 
[84.10-1314.60] 
5.36 
(0.36) 
[4.43-7.18] 
Number of observations 2194 1170 547 
13 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sum of the three intelligence tests divided according to the respondents' highest 
educational level in 1993. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
1948 cohort 1953 cohon 
Highest educational 
level in 1993 
elementary 
school (1961) 
experimental 
comprehensive 
school (1961) 
elementary 
school (1966) 
comprehensive 
school (1966) 
Less than 9 years (EDI) 
9 years (ED2) 
Upper secondary schooling 
up to 2 years (ED3) 
Upper secondary schooling 
more than 2 years (ED4) 
Post secondary education up 
to 2 years (ED5) 
Post secondary education 
more than 2 years (ED6) 
Doctoral degree (ED7) 
Total 
55.42 
(14.08) 
N=382 
62.22 
(15.43) 
N=167 
61.08 
(14.70) 
N=514 
67.84 
(14.78) 
N=437 
70.32 
(15.75) 
N=240 
78.20 
(14.03) 
N=433 
83.24 
(11.63) 
N=21 
66.13 
(16.57) 
N=2194 
60.16 
(15.64) 
N=19 
57.24 
(14.59) 
N=160 
62.53 
(15.29) 
N=335 
70.61 
(14.50) 
N=240 
71.59 
(13.58) 
N=140 
78.16 
(15.46) 
N=249 
84.93 
(12.45) 
N=27 
68.35 
(16.60) 
N=1170 
55.86 
(14.53) 
N=88 
65.15 
(14.12) 
N=72 
61.27 
(15.74) 
N=164 
69.68 
(17.70) 
N=66 
73.64 
(14.36) 
N=86 
78.59 
(15.66) 
N=70 
73.0 
(-) 
N=l 
66.11 
(16.99) 
N=547 
51.40 
(13.77) 
N=10 
60.26 
(15.20) 
N=475 
64.42 
(14.75) 
N=711 
72.00 
(14.43) 
N=367 
76.04 
(14.20) 
N=423 
80.27 
(14.57) 
N=451 
86.09 
(11.61) 
N=34 
69.88 
(16.48) 
N=2471 
series is characterized by lower means and a higher standard deviation than the other 
tests. Moreover, even though the test scores are higher for those in the experimental 
comprehensive school (column one) than for those in the old school system (column 
two), those in the elementary school had higher marks. Unfortunately, for the 1953 
cohort, the two different scales make it impossible to compare the marks of those in the 
old elementary school and those in the new comprehensive school. 
Descriptive statistics of the sum of the three intelligence test scores divided 
according to the respondent's highest educational level in 1993 are reported in Table 2. 
The highest educational level completed in 1993 is closely related to the test results, 
which supports the hypothesis that ability bias might be a serious problem. As reported 
in Table 1, the test scores are higher for those in the (experimental) comprehensive 
school, with one exception. The fact that the test score outcomes are in favour for the 
junior secondary school (row 2) could be due to problems associated with selectivity. 
The opportunity to go on to further education influences pupils' decisions to attend the 
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junior secondary school, which implies a positive selection. Furthermore, many 
theoretically oriented pupils dropped-out from the senior level of the comprehensive 
school and switched to the junior secondary school. However, those who did attend the 
junior secondary school with the aim of further education, but refrained from further 
education, may imply a negative selection which will reduce the positive sorting effect. 
It is not only the test score outcomes that differ between the different school 
systems; the proportion of those with a university degree in 1993 differs aswell. A larger 
proportion of the individuals enrolled in the (experimental) comprehensive school in 
1961 and 1966, respectively, are to be found in ED5 to ED7 in 1993, which can explain 
the variation in earnings in Table 1. However, the increase in test results and the higher 
educational level completed may not necessarily be caused by the reform of the school 
system. One explanation is that the comprehensive school was the dominant type of 
school in university districts. 
The empirical findings in Table 2 and the conclusions are unchanged when 
each educational level also is divided into one general and one technical programme. 
However, whereas the test scores for those with a longer technical post secondary 
degree (ED6) are substantially higher than for those with a longer general post 
secondary degree, the opposite is true for those with a longer upper secondary degree, 
see Table A1 in the appendix. 
Tables 3 and 4 display the correlations between the intelligence tests, 
achievement tests, marks and earnings. As expected, the test that measures the ability to 
find the opposite of a given word is strongly correlated with achievement tests and 
marks in Swedish {Reading and Writing) and English, respectively. Similarly, the ability 
to complete a specific number series is strongly correlated with achievement test and 
mark in mathematics. The correlations between the intelligence test representing the 
spatial factor of intelligence (Metal Folding), different achievement tests and marks, 
however, are rather weak. Furthermore, comparable correlations between the 
elementary school and the (experimental) comprehensive school are almost the same. 
The correlations between the measures of ability and earnings are higher for 
those in the elementary school than for those in the (experimental) comprehensive 
school. In addition, the figures are higher for those born in 1948 than for those born in 
1953. However, the correlations between the intelligence tests and earnings are 
influenced by differences in later educational level, which aggravates the interpretation. 
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Table 3: Correlations between the test scores, marks and earnings divided according to the two compulsory school 
systems (1961). The correlations for individuals in the elementary school are reported below the main 
diagonal, whereas the correlations for individuals enrolled in the experimental comprehensive school are 
reported above the main diagonal. 
© d o © © © © Ö © © 
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Table 4: Correlations between the test scores, marks and earnings divided according to the two compulsory school 
systems (1966). The correlations for individuals in the elementary school are reported below the main 
diagonal, whereas the correlations for individuals enrolled in the comprehensive school are reported above 
the main diagonal. 
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IV. Empirical Findings 
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimated effect on earnings of different educational levels for 
the 1948 cohort and the 1953 cohort, respectively, controlling for alternative sets of 
variables. The results presented in column one replicate the positive relationship 
between educational length and earnings found in other Swedish studies.7 For the two 
lowest educational levels completed, I distinguish between those enrolled in the old 
school system (extension old) and those enrolled in the new school system (extension 
new). The reference group consists of individuals with the comprehensive school as 
their highest educational level completed (ED2new). 
More than two years of upper secondary schooling (ED4) and higher education 
enter significantly in the equation. Furthermore, the educational wage premiums are 
substantially lower for the 1953 cohort compared to the 1948 cohort. For instance, the 
wage premium for more than 2 years of post secondary schooling (ED6) is 41 per cent 
for those born in 1948 but 36 per cent for the 1953 cohort. This fall in the estimated 
educational wage premiums is not necessarily an effect of changes in the wage 
premiums for education alone; it can also arise if an improper grouping scheme is used. 
One might expect a considerable within group variation in the wage premium for 
education. For instance, the wage premium for a technical programme may differ from 
that of a general programme. Thus, changes in the proportion of students in the technical 
programme can influence the estimated wage premiums for education.8 
Also, it is notable that the change in the school system seems to have affected 
earnings negatively. The wage premium for junior secondary school (ED2old) is higher 
than that of comprehensive school, although it is not statistically significant. It does not 
emerge from the tables whether the pattern also persists for further higher education. 
7. The interpretation of the coefficients on educational level, however, is somewhat different. The 
parameters on educational level consist of two parts: one direct effect of schooling and one indirect 
effect due to differences in work experience, i.e. 
lny = ßj + ß25cÄ + ß3 (Age - Sch - 6) + £ = ßj + ß3 (Age - 6) + (ß2 - ß3) Seh + e 
8. The estimates in column one of Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix, suggest that the magnitude of the 
educational wage premium for each educational level differs between the two programmes. Further-
more, the proportion of students of technology in the later age cohort has increased in the higher edu-
cational groups, and decreased in the lower educational groups, see Table Al in the appendix. 
However, dividing each educational level into one technical and one general programme does not 
alter previous results. The decline in the wage premium for education between the two age cohorts 
remains. 
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Table 5: OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates (1948 Cohort). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Independent 
variables 
EDlold 
EDI new 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Family back-
ground 
Intelligence 
test scores 
Achievement 
test scores 
Marks 
dummies 
cont. var. 
R2-adj 
(I) 
-0.031 
(0.033) 
-0.040 
(0.082) 
0.072 
(0.038) 
0.050 
(0.029) 
0.185*« 
(0.030) 
0.232** 
(0.032) 
0.412** 
(0.030) 
0.643** 
(0.056) 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
0.275 
(ID 
-0.024 
(0.033) 
-0.037 
(0.082) 
0.076* 
(0.038) 
0.049 
(0.029) 
0.177** 
(0.030) 
0.228** 
(0.032) 
0.397** 
(0.030) 
0.624** 
(0.057) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
0.222 
(HI) 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.051 
(0.081) 
0.062 
(0.037) 
0.036 
(0.029) 
0.145** 
(0.030) 
0.192** 
(0.032) 
0.340** 
(0.031) 
0.550** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
0.234 
(IV) 
-0.019 
(0.032) 
-0.046 
(0.081) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
0.031 
(0.029) 
0.134** 
(0.030) 
0.180** 
(0.032) 
0.318** 
(0.032) 
0.526** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
0.241 
(V) 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.044 
(0.081) 
0.045 
(0.038) 
0.029 
(0.029) 
0.137** 
(0.030) 
0.183** 
(0.033) 
0.328** 
(0.032) 
0.541** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
0.238 
(VI) 
-0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.043 
(0.081) 
0.044 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.029) 
0.133** 
(0.030) 
0.181** 
(0.033) 
0.325** 
(0.032) 
0.542** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
0.237 
(VII) 
-0.020 
(0.032) 
-0.054 
(0.081) 
0.048 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.029) 
0.131** 
(0.030) 
0.175** 
(0.033) 
0.313** 
(0.032) 
0.514** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
0.244 
Note: The sample size is 3364. 
_old: The old school system. 
_new: The new school system. 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
However, dividing each educational level on the basis of type of school attended by the 
pupils in 1961, does not give a clear picture (results not reported). 
The specification in column two of Tables 5 and 6 attempts to control for the 
effect of unobserved ability on earnings by the use of family background variables. I 
have used information on parental education and occupation. However, including these 
variables does not considerably affect the estimated premiums for education. The 
magnitude of the wage premiums that are significantly different from zero in the 
equations are reduced by 2 to 8 per cent. For example, the coefficient on ED4 in Table 
6 decreases from 0.121 to 0.111.9 
9. The coefficients on the family background variables are presented in Table A4 in the appendix. 
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Table 6: OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates (1953 Cohort). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
(V) 
-0.016 
(0.044) 
0.148 
(0.103) 
0.062 
(0.044) 
0.027 
(0.019) 
0.082** 
(0.023) 
0.167** 
(0.022) 
0.288** 
(0.024) 
0.401** 
(0.059) 
(VI) 
0.013 
(0.041) 
0.144 
(0.102) 
0.072 
(0.044) 
0.031 
(0.019) 
0.087** 
(0.022) 
0.173** 
(0.022) 
0.290** 
(0.024) 
0.396** 
(0.059) 
(VII) 
0.004 
(0.045) 
0.155 
(0.103) 
0.082 
(0.046) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
0.082** 
(0.023) 
0.165** 
(0.023) 
0.287** 
(0.024) 
0.397** 
(0.059) 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
no no yes 
no no yes 
yes no yes 
no yes no 
0.196 0.198 0.198 
Note: The sample size is 3018. 
_old: The old school system. 
_new: The new school system. 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
The addition of explicit ability controls (columns three to seven) does more to 
reduce the wage premium for education than do the family background variables. The 
figures indicate an upward bias as large as 25 per cent in some coefficients on education 
in the specifications that ignore explicit measures of ability. Moreover, the estimates are 
not very sensitive to alternative definitions of ability.10 Furthermore, including 
measures of ability does not eliminate the low effect of family background variables on 
the wage premium for education. In conformity with previous US studies, the estimates 
suggest that measures of ability associated with mathematics are important in wage 
lO.The coefficients on the controls for ability, which correspond to each specification, are reported iin 
Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix. For purposes of comparability, test scores and marks have been 
standardized. 
Independent 
variables 
EDlold 
ED 1 new 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Family back-
ground 
Intelligence 
test scores 
Achievement 
test scores 
Marks 
dummies 
cont. var. 
(I) OD (HD (IV) 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
0.128 
(0.103) 
0.050 
(0.041) 
0.034 
(0.019) 
0.121** 
(0.022) 
0.210** 
(0.021) 
0.355** 
(0.021) 
0.485** 
(0.057) 
yes 
no 
no 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
0.128 
(0.103) 
0.054 
(0.041) 
0.034 
(0.018) 
0.111** 
(0.022) 
0.203** 
(0.021) 
0.335** 
(0.022) 
0.454** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
no 
-0.024 
(0.038) 
0.151 
(0.103) 
0.044 
(0.041) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
0.088** 
(0.022) 
0.173** 
(0.022) 
0.297** 
(0.023) 
0.407** 
(0.059) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
0.001 
(0.041) 
0.146 
(0.102) 
0.064 
(0.044) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
0.084** 
(0.022) 
0.168** 
(0.022) 
0.286** 
(0.023) 
0.391** 
(0.059) 
yes 
yes 
no 
tf^adj 0.177 0.187 0.194 0.199 
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deermination. Furthermore, it does not matter whether marks are represented by 
dunmies or by continuous variables. The estimated wage premiums are similar for the 
tw> specifications in columns five and six of Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, the adjusted 
R2s are only slightly higher for the specification in column six. 
Thus, not considering omitted ability bias could be of great consequence for 
inference about the magnitude of the wage premium for education. Furthermore, 
coitrolling for ability reduces the differences in the wage premium for the higher 
edicational levels and increases the differences in the premium for the lower levels, 
wten the two age cohorts are compared.11 These results may be explained by changes 
in [he selection into higher education and/or by a reduction in the return to ability. 
However, as indicated in Table 2, there is little evidence that there was an increasing 
pnportion of individuals of high ability in the higher educational groups for the 1953 
coiort compared to the 1948 cohort. The coefficients on the ability controls reported in 
Ta>les A5 and A6 in the appendix, however, suggest that the wage premium for ability 
in general is higher for the 1948 cohort compared to the 1953 cohort. 
So far, the wage premiums have been held constant. Let us suppose, in line 
wih the theoretical specification (5), that there is an interaction between education and 
ablity in wage equations. The first column of Table 7 and 8, respectively, presents the 
cotfficients on educational levels for the specification without controls of ability. 
Cdumns two and five present wage premium estimates of the specifications with test 
scaes on the Number Series and the achievement test in Mathematics as regressors. 
The predicted mean impacts of education on log wages, calculated from 
confidents in the specification including an interaction term between test scores on the 
Nunber Series and the highest completed educational level, are reported in columns 
thne and four. The evaluation point distinguishes the two columns. In columns six and 
se>en, I repeat the estimations of columns threee and four, but using the scores of the 
aclievement test in mathematics in place of the intelligence test scores. 
The results reported in columns three and four in Table 7 suggest that the 
specification with the intelligence test interacted with educational level leads to 
predicted wage premiums somewhat smaller than comparable premiums presented in 
colimn two. Analogous estimates in Table 8, however, do not show the same 
ll.limilar results are also obtained when each educational level is divided into one general and one 
cchnical programme, see Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix. 
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Table 7: The Predicted Wage Premium of Education (1948 Cohort). 
Mean impact 
EDlold 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Family back-
ground 
Ability 
ED_x Ability 
tf-adj 
a) 
-0.024 
-0.037 
0.076 
0.049 
0.177 
0.228 
0.397 
0.624 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
0.222 
(ID 
-0.024 
-0.050 
0.066 
0.038 
0.150 
0.201 
0.352 
0.566 
yes 
yes 
yes1 
no 
0.233 
(IIDa 
-0.045 
-0.066 
0.045 
0.026 
0.138 
0.195 
0.323 
0.554 
yes 
yes 
yes1 
yes1 
(TV)b 
-0.041 
-0.064 
0.049 
0.027 
0.137 
0.194 
0.323 
0.550 
yes 
yes 
yes1 
yes1 
0.234 
(V) 
-0.022 
-0.040 
0.048 
0.031 
0.134 
0.178 
0.317 
0.526 
yes 
yes 
yes2 
no 
0.240 
(VI)a 
0.099 
0.057 
0.339 
0.111 
0.172 
0.375 
0.297 
0.199 
yes 
yes 
yes2 
yes2 
(VII)b 
0.104 
0.061 
0.341 
0.112 
0.172 
0.373 
0.296 
0.207 
yes 
yes 
yes2 
yes2 
0.244 
Note: see Table 5. 
(a): Evaluated at mean ability for all. 
(1): Intelligence test (Number series) 
(b): Evaluated at mean ability for each educational level. 
(2): Achievement test (Mathematics) 
Table 8: The Predicted Wage Premium of Education (1953 Cohort). 
Mean Impact 
EDlold 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Family back-
ground 
Ability 
ED_x Ability 
tf-adj 
a) 
-0.034 
0.128 
0.054 
0.034 
0.111 
0.203 
0.335 
0.454 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
0.787 
Note: see Table 6. 
(a): Evaluated at mean for all. 
(1): Intelligence test (Number series) 
(ID 
-0.025 
0.149 
0.048 
0.030 
0.092 
0.180 
0.306 
0.418 
yes 
yes 
yes1 
no 
0.194 
(IID* 
-0.051 
0.076 
0.050 
0.032 
0.095 
0.171 
0.321 
0.312 
yes 
yes 
yes1 
yes1 
(TV)b 
-0.047 
0.087 
0.050 
0.032 
0.095 
0.172 
0.320 
0.324 
yes 
yes 
yes1 
yes1 
0.194 
(V) 
-0.027 
0.146 
0.036 
0.024 
0.079 
0.162 
0.282 
0.390 
yes 
yes 
yes2 
no 
0.799 
(VI)a 
0.027 
0.224 
0.109 
0.035 
0.093 
0.139 
0.279 
0.211 
yes 
yes 
yes2 
yes2 
(b): Evaluated at mean for each educational level. 
(2): Achievement test (Mathematics) 
(VII)b 
0.033 
0.241 
0.110 
0.035 
0.093 
0.139 
0.279 
0.217 
yes 
yes 
yes2 
yes2 
0.200 
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consistence. Furthermore, it does not matter whether the predicted impact of educational 
level on wages is evaluated at the mean ability level for all or at the mean ability level 
wkhin each completed educational level. 
The specification with the achievement test scores interacted with educational 
level, columns six and seven of Tables 7 and 8, generates estimates that differ 
considerably from the estimates in column five. Including an interaction term between 
ability and educational level in the wage equation gives rise to higher wage premiums 
for lower levels of education, and lower wage premiums for higher educational levels. 
A* above, it does not matter whether the predicted impact of educational levels on 
wages is evaluated at the mean ability level for all or at the mean ability level within 
each educational level completed. 
Due to higher expected productivity one might expect ability and the marginal 
beiefit of education to be positively correlated, i.e. k < 0 in equation (2). However, a 
positive relationship is not supported by the empirical findings for the 1948 cohort 
presented in Table A7 in the appendix. The estimates indicate that the return to ability 
and the marginal benefit of education are negatively related. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms are generally negative, although not always statistically significant. 
Similar results are reported in Ashenfelter and Rouse (1996). They show that individuals 
from families with higher levels of ability receive a lower marginal benefit of education. 
V. Sensitivity analyses 
In the previous analyses, the implication of omitted ability variables on the 
estimated wage premium for education has been examined by including measures of 
ability in the earnings equation.The decision to participate in the labour force, however, 
may not be independent of ability and schooling. Thus, applying this procedure requires 
that ability affect the decision to participate in the labour force for different educational 
groups in a similar way as it affect the wage premiums, or at least that the order of 
precedence in labour force participation probabilities for different educational levels is 
unaffected. Otherwise, the magnitudes of the ability bias presented in previous section 
are disturbed by selectivity bias. 
Let us put the individuals into two categories: workers and non-workers 
selected according to the income criteria (annual income higher than SEK 84,000). 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 9. Notice that 92 per cent of pupils born in 
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Table 9: Educational level and test scores for workers and non-workers. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Variables 
Educational level completed 
EDI old 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED2new 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Intelligence tests 
Number Series 
Metal Folding 
Opposite 
Number of observations 
workers 
0.114 
0.006 
0.050 
0.048 
0.252 
0.201 
0.113 
0.203 
0.014 
20.99 
(7.59) 
22.59 
(7.26) 
23.33 
(6.33) 
3364 
1948 cohort 
non-workers 
0.107 
0.007 
0.055 
0.072 
0.399 
0.179 
0.100 
0.072 
0.010 
18.79 
(7.55) 
20.97 
(7.31) 
21.72 
(6.18) 
291 
workers 
0.031 
0.004 
0.024 
0.161 
0.292 
0.144 
0.166 
0.168 
0.011 
21.47 
(7.77) 
23.16 
(7.30) 
24.44 
(6.12) 
3111 
1953 cohort 
non-workers 
0.036 
0.014 
0.031 
0.235 
0.393 
0.123 
0.100 
0.059 
0.009 
19.46 
(7.83) 
22.43 
(7.65) 
23.36 
(6.32) 
643 
1948 participate in the labour force in 1993, while the proportion for the 1953 cohort is 
only 83 per cent. In line with previous results in Table 1, test scores are higher for the 
1953 cohort. In addition, means of the three intelligence tests are higher for workers 
compared to non-workers. Furthermore, the educational length seems to affect the 
labour force participation. More than 80 per cent of those in the non-workers group have 
at most upper secondary schooling more than two years (ED4) as highest educational 
level completed. This in contrast to slightly more than 65 per cent of those in the group 
of workers. 
Table 10 reports marginal effects of the probit model. The results suggest that 
the educational level has a strong positive effect on the labour force participation. In line 
with previous results, including measures of ability in the probit model reduces the 
marginal effects of education on the participation probability in a similar way as before. 
Furthermore, only number series is significantly different from zero in the equations, 
which parallel the results reported in section IV, see Table A8 in the appendix. Thus, the 
way data are generated would not affect the implications of omitted ability variables on 
the estimated wage premiums. 
Table 10. Probit analysis. Marginal effects. 
1948 cohort1 1953 cohort 
b de pendent 
variables 
EDlold 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Intelligence tests 
a) 
0.039 
0.024 
0.031 
0.001 
0.041 
0.041 
0.047 
0.046 
yes 
no 
(II) 
0.037 
0.022 
0.0252 
-0.004 
0.032 
0.031 
0.044 
0.031 
yes 
yes 
a) 
0.050 
-0.259 
0.035 
0.017 
0.069 
0.090 
0.095 
0.073 
no 
(ID 
0.049 
-0.257 
0.032 
0.016 
0.065 
0.087 
0.093 
0.064 
yes 
Note: 
(1): The sample size is 3655. 
(2): The sample size is 3754. 
_»ld: The old school system. 
_iew: The new school system. 
A second source of selectivity bias exists if missing data in the measures of 
ability are systematically related to ability. Since, the intelligence/achievement tests 
were taken on a voluntary basis, in the sense of tolerating individuals absent from school 
on the days of testing, exclusion of non-test takers in the samples would also imply a 
selection of individuals. It appears that individuals absent from school on the days of 
testing, for at least one test, had in general lower school marks than the test takers. 
Moreover, the wage premiums for schooling are higher in samples that also include 
individuals with missing observations on test scores, see Table 11. Thus, omitting these 
individuals might affect the magnitude of the omitted ability bias. 
However, the estimates reported in Tables 12 and 13 do not suggest that this is 
a problem. Through information on school marks in mathematics it has been possible to 
estimate the omitted ability bias for the two groups. The picture that appears is that the 
reduction in wage premiums for the four highest educational levels is only somewhat 
higher in samples that also includes individuals with no information on scores from the 
intelligence tests. 
Another potential source of error in the estimated wage premiums for 
schooling is that erroneous measures of ability would contaminate the ordinary least 
squares estimates. I follow earlier research and use instrumental variables to generate 
consistent estimates. In the estimations, I allow included regressors with accompanying 
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Table 11: OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Independent 
variables 
EDlold 
EDI new 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
N=3364 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.040 
(0.082) 
0.072* 
(0.038) 
0.050 
(0.029) 
0.185** 
(0.030) 
0.232** 
(0.032) 
0.412** 
(0.030) 
0.643** 
(0.056) 
1948 cohort 
N=4239' 
-0.008 
(0.027) 
-0.036 
(0.061) 
0.067* 
(0.032) 
0.070** 
(0.024) 
0.190** 
(0.025) 
0.246** 
(0.027) 
0.431** 
(0.025) 
0.661** 
(0.048) 
tf-adj 0.215 0.216 
N=3018 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
0.128 
(0.103) 
0.050 
(0.041) 
0.034 
(0.019) 
0.121** 
(0.022) 
0.210** 
(0.021) 
0.355** 
(0.021) 
0.485** 
(0.057) 
yes 
0.177 
1953 cohort 
N=3634] 
-0.026 
(0.034) 
0.038 
(0.062) 
0.058 
(0.038) 
0.046** 
(0.016) 
0.142** 
(0.019) 
0.232** 
(0.019) 
0.383** 
(0.018) 
0.488** 
(0.052) 
yes 
0.197 
Notes: 
(1): includes individuals with missing observations on test scores. 
_old: The old school system. 
_new: The new school system. 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
instrumental variables to alternate between available measures of ability. The 
instrumental variables estimates are displayed in Table 14. In conformity with previous 
results by Griliches (1977), Blackburn and Neumark (1995), instrumenting for ability 
further reduces the wage premium for education. The estimates, however, are in the 
main only slightly lower than corresponding estimates reported in Tables 5 and 6, with 
the exception of column 6. Moreover, the performance of Hausman specification tests 
does not indicate that measurement error in the measures of ability is a problem, i.e. it 
is not necessary to instrument for ability. 
Finally, the earnings function that relates the logarithm of hourly earnings to 
years of schooling (and years of experience and its square) dominates previous studies. 
In this perspective, I use two unconventional measures of earnings and schooling: 
annual earnings and educational level completed, respectively. To examine how 
sensitive the estimates are for different measures of earnings and schooling, I employ 
data from the Swedish Level of Living Survey (SLLS) from 1991, see Fritzell and 
Lundberg (1994) for details. This is the most widely used Swedish data set for wage 
Tabk 12: OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates (1948 Cohort). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Indtpendent 
varables 
EDI old 
EOlnew 
ED2old 
BD3 
ED4 
BD5 
ED6 
ED7 
County of 
rtsidence 
Varies 
(Mathematics) 
tf-tdj 
N=3364 N=4239' 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.040 
(0.082) 
0.072* 
(0.038) 
0.050 
(0.029) 
0.185** 
(0.030) 
0.232** 
(0.032) 
0.412** 
(0.030) 
0.643** 
(0.056) 
yes 
0.275 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
-0.045 
(0.081) 
0.038 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.029) 
0.139** 
(0.030) 
0.182** 
(0.032) 
0.333** 
(0.031) 
0.550** 
(0.056) 
yes 
yes 
0.230 
-0.008 
(0.027) 
-0.036 
(0.061) 
0.067* 
(0.032) 
0.070** 
(0.024) 
0.190** 
(0.025) 
0.246** 
(0.027) 
0.431** 
(0.025) 
0.661** 
(0.048) 
yes 
0.216 
-0.009 
(0.026) 
-0.030 
(0.061) 
0.038 
(0.031) 
0.051* 
(0.024) 
0.146** 
(0.025) 
0.200** 
(0.027) 
0.354** 
(0.026) 
0.567** 
(0.049) 
yes 
yes 
0.232 
(1): ncludes individuals with missing observations on test scores. 
_old The old school system. 
_nev: The new school system. 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
Tablt 13: OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates (1953 Cohort). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Independent 
vahtbles 
EDlold 
EDInew 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
County of 
reiidence 
Mirks 
(Mathematics) 
R2-alj 
N=3018 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
0.128 
(0.103) 
0.050 
(0.041) 
0.034 
(0.019) 
0.121** 
(0.022) 
0.210** 
(0.021) 
0.355** 
(0.021) 
0.485** 
(0.057) 
yes 
no 
0.177 
-0.029 
(0.038) 
0.144 
(0.103) 
0.028 
(0.041) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
0.089** 
(0.022) 
0.170** 
(0.022) 
0.301** 
(0.022) 
0.417** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
0.187 
(1): hcludes individuals with missing observations on test scores. 
_old The old school system. 
_new: The new school system. 
-0.026 
(0.034) 
0.038 
(0.063) 
0.058 
(0.038) 
0.046** 
(0.016) 
0.142** 
(0.019) 
0.232** 
(0.019) 
0.383** 
(0.0182) 
0.488** 
(0.052) 
yes 
no 
0.797 
N=3634J 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 pe 
-0.019 
(0.034) 
0.055 
(0.062) 
0.039 
(0.038) 
0.036* 
(0.016) 
0.113** 
(0.020) 
0.197** 
(0.019) 
0.334** 
(0.020) 
0.427** 
(0.053) 
yes 
yes 
0.206 
cent level. 
cent level. 
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Table 14: Instrumental Variable Log Earnings Equation Estimates. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
(I) 
-0.019 
(0.038) 
0.146 
(0.102) 
0.039 
(0.041) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
0.078** 
(0.022) 
0.162** 
(0.022) 
0.282** 
(0.023) 
0.390** 
(0.059) 
1953 cohort (N= 
(II) 
-0.005 
(0.041) 
0.146 
(0.102) 
0.055 
(0.043) 
0.028 
(0.019) 
0.082** 
(0.022) 
0.165** 
(0.022) 
0.284** 
(0.024) 
0.391** 
(0.059) 
3018) 
(HI) 
-0.005 
(0.041) 
0.125 
(0.103) 
0.082 
(0.044) 
0.040* 
(0.019) 
0.114** 
(0.022) 
0.205** 
(0.021) 
0.338** 
(0.022) 
0.453** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
instrument 
instrument1 
0.199 
yes 
yes 
instrument 
yes 
instrument1 
0.198 
yes 
yes 
instrument 
instrument 
yes2 
0.191 
_old: The old school system. 
_new: The new school system. 
(1): dummies 
(2): cont. variables 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
equations. The data set contains information on hourly earnings, annual earnings, years 
of schooling and highest educational level completed. To facilitate comparisons, the 
data set is bounded to include individuals in the age interval 35 to 50 years. Furthermore, 
only individuals who received income from work as employed and with total annual 
income higher than SEK 72,000 are included. 
The results reported in columns one and two of Table 15, suggest that the 
magnitude of the educational wage premiums differ between the two measures of 
earnings. The wage premiums are substantially lower in column one compared to 
column two. This might be an indication of education-related differences in hours 
worked. The average number of hours worked, for full-time workers between 35 and 50 
years of age, increases gradually from 38.4 hours per week (EDI) to 41.6 hours (ED7). 
Independent 
variables 
EDlold 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Family back-
ground 
Intelligence 
tests 
Achievement 
tests 
Marks 
R2adj 
(1) 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.040 
(0.081) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
0.030 
(0.029) 
0.134** 
(0.030) 
0.179** 
(0.033) 
0.319** 
(0.032) 
0.529** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
instrument 
instrument1 
0.239 
(ID 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.048 
(0.081) 
0.044 
(0.037) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
0.129** 
(0.030) 
0.175** 
(0.033) 
0.317** 
(0.032) 
0.531** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
instrument 
yes 
instrument1 
0.239 
an) 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.042 
(0.081) 
0.049 
(0.037) 
0.031 
(0.029) 
0.134** 
(0.030) 
0.179** 
(0.032) 
0.318** 
(0.032) 
0.528** 
(0.058) 
yes 
yes 
instrument 
instrument 
yes2 
0.240 
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Tabe 15: OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates. Swedish Level of Living Survey 1991. Standard errors are 
repcrted in parenthesis. 
Inffi pendent 
varables 
!CH 
ID1 
ID3 
ID4 
ID5 
ID6 
ID7 
Cottrols of 
Experience 
Experience squared 
tf-idj 
Dependent variable 
Log Hourly 
Earnings 
-0.080 
(0.047) 
-0.001 
(0.042) 
0.178** 
(0.048) 
0.245** 
(0.047) 
0.359** 
(0.049) 
0.465** 
(0.081) 
yes 
yes 
0.241 
Log Annual 
Earnings 
-0.044 
(0.053) 
0.027 
(0.048) 
0.200** 
(0.054) 
0.284** 
(0.053) 
0.498** 
(0.055) 
0.587** 
(0.091) 
yes 
yes 
0.265 
Dependent variable 
Log Hourly 
Earnings 
0.047** 
(0.004) 
yes 
yes 
0.216 
Log Annual 
Earnings 
0.055** 
(0.004) 
yes 
yes 
0.225 
Noe: The sample size is 629. 
SC3: years of schooling 
* Salistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
In a similar way, the return to schooling is lower in column three compared to 
cohmn four.12 Thus, we can expect that the wage premiums presented in previous 
seaion are somewhat too high, due to the incapability of controlling for hours worked. 
Furthermore, the wage premiums reported in column two are considerably higher than 
those reported in Tables 5 and 6. The fact that I in Table 15 also control for experience 
is cne possible explanation to the large differences in wage premiums. 
In order to understand how omitted ability variables affect the estimated return 
to schooling, I impute schooling on the basis of mean years of schooling reported for 
eaci educational level in the SLLS sample. Table 16 displays the estimates on the 
imputed schooling coefficient. In conformity with previous results, including family 
background variables has a small effect on the estimated return to schooling. The 
coefficients are reduced by roughly 5 per cent. Including different measures of ability, 
hovever, reduces the return to schooling by as much as 20 per cent, which is on a level 
witii previous changes in wage premiums. Thus, we can expect that omitted ability 
12. Schooling squared is not significantly different from zero. 
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Table 16: OLS estimates of the imputed schooling coefficient. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
1953 cohort2 
a) a» am <rv) 
0.047** 0.044** 0.039** 0.037** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
yes 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
0.775 
yes 
yes 
DO 
no 
no 
0.185 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
DO 
0.192 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
0.195 
Notes: 
(1): The sample size is 3364. 
(2): The sample size is 3018. 
SCHimp: imputed schooling. 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
variables affect the estimated return to schooling and the estimated educational wage 
premiums in a similar way. 
VI. Conclusions 
In this study, I have used two Swedish data sets, which could not hitherto have been used 
for wage equations. The data sets consist of several measures of ability, such as 
intelligence tests, achievement tests and school marks. The information was collected 
when the respondents were between 12 and 13 years of age. Furthermore, instead of 
years of schooling I use information on highest educational level completed. 
The empirical findings support the general opinion that the returns to education 
are biased upwards. Including measures of ability in the earnings equation reduces the 
wage premiums for education by as much as 25 per cent in some coefficients, with an 
avarage reduction around 22 per cent for the 1948 cohort and 18 per cent for the 1953 
cohort. Further, controlling for ability reduces the observed decline in wage premiums 
for education between the two age cohorts, but the decline is not eliminated. In 
conformity with previous US studies, the results suggest that measures of ability 
associated with mathematics have significant effect on wages. 
Independent 
variables 
SCHimp 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Family back-
ground 
Intelligence 
test scores 
Achievement 
test scores 
Marks 
a) 
0.051** 
(0.002) 
yes 
DO 
DO 
no 
no 
1948 cohort1 
(11) 
0.049** 
(0.002) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
OH) 
0.042** 
(0.002) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
(TV) 
0.039** 
(0.002) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
&*dj 0.210 0.217 0.231 0.241 
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The magnitude of omitted ability bias presented are lower than comparable 
figures reported in US studies. However, both differences in the magnitudes of wage 
premiums and ability bias between countries might originate from errors in variables. 
For this purpose it would be desirable to have similar measures of ability - perfectly 
measured and not influenced of differences in age or education. 
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Appendix 
Al: Pescriptive statistics of the sum of the three intelligence tests divided according to the respondents' highest 
educitional level in 1993. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Higlest Educational 
Levi in 1993 
£D1 
2D2 
ZD3 
General 
Technical 
ZD4 
General 
Technical 
iD5 
General 
Technical 
iD6 
General 
Technical 
<D7 
General 
Technical 
Nurwer of observations 
1948 cohort 
elementary school 
(1961) 
55.43 
(14.06) 
N=383 
62.17 
(15.40) 
N=168 
61.47 
(13.74) 
N=199 
60.82 
(15.25) 
N=317 
67.93 
(15.18) 
N=131 
67.70 
(14.71) 
N=307 
69.88 
(15.01) 
N=168 
71.36 
(17.44) 
N=72 
76.15 
(14.14) 
N=336 
85.30 
(11.06) 
N=97 
82.86 
(11.35) 
N=14 
84.00 
(13.06) 
N=7 
2199 
experimental 
comprehensive 
school (1961) 
60.16 
(15.64) 
N=19 
57.24 
(14.59) 
N=160 
63.58 
(16.04) 
N=118 
61.96 
(14.87) 
N=217 
72.23 
(13.42) 
N=93 
69.64 
(15.06) 
N=148 
72.04 
(13.77) 
N=93 
70.68 
(13.29) 
N=47 
76.41 
(15.38) 
N=196 
84.60 
(14.12) 
N=53 
85.56 
(12.92) 
N=18 
83.67 
(12.10) 
N=9 
1171 
1953 cohort 
elementary school 
(1966) 
55.86 
(14.53) 
N=88 
65.15 
(14.12) 
N=72 
60.38 
(15.55) 
N=56 
61.74 
(15.89) 
N=108 
76.06 
(17.32) 
N=36 
62.03 
(15.13) 
N=30 
72.06 
(16.04) 
N=47 
75.54 
(11.96) 
N=39 
76.78 
(15.22) 
N=50 
82.33 
(16.19) 
N=21 
73.00 
(-) 
N=l 
~ 
548 
comprehensive 
school (1966) 
51.40 
(13.77) 
N=10 
60.26 
(15.20) 
N=475 
64.49 
(14.64) 
N=267 
64.39 
(14.84) 
N=444 
75.03 
(13.66) 
N=219 
67.52 
(14.42) 
N=148 
73.96 
(14.12) 
N=245 
78.91 
(13.85) 
N=178 
78.05 
(14.75) 
N=328 
86.05 
(12.38) 
N=124 
85.39 
(12.67) 
N=18 
86.88 
(10.65) 
N=16 
2472 
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A2: OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates (1948 Cohort). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Independent variables 
EDlold 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3_ 
general 
technical 
ED4_ 
general 
technical 
ED5_ 
general 
technical 
ED6_ 
general 
technical 
ED7_ 
general 
technical 
Controls of 
County of 
residence 
Family background 
Intelligence tests 
Achievement tests 
Marks 
dummies 
cont. var. 
R2-adj 
(I) 
-0.032 
(0.032) 
-0.040 
(0.082) 
0.073 
(0.038) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
0.065* 
(0.031) 
0.182** 
(0.035) 
0.187** 
(0.031) 
0.240** 
(0.034) 
0.217** 
(0.041) 
0.386** 
(0.031) 
0.508** 
(0.039) 
0.716** 
(0.066) 
0.501** 
(0.089) 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
0.279 
(ID 
-0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.037 
(0.082) 
0.076* 
(0.038) 
0.021 
(0.033) 
0.065* 
(0.031) 
0.167** 
(0.035) 
0,183** 
(0.031) 
0.236** 
(0.034) 
0.214** 
(0.041) 
0.370** 
(0.031) 
0.501** 
(0.039) 
0.698** 
(0.067) 
0.489** 
(0.090) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
0.226 
GU) 
-0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.051 
(0.081) 
0.063 
(0.037) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
0.053 
(0.030) 
0.132** 
(0.035) 
0.154** 
(0.031) 
0.201** 
(0.034) 
0.179** 
(0.041) 
0.319** 
(0.032) 
0.427** 
(0.041) 
0.625** 
(0.067) 
0.413** 
(0.090) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
0.238 
(IV) 
-0.019 
(0.032) 
-0.046 
(0.081) 
0.049 
(0.037) 
0.000 
(0.033) 
0.050 
(0.030) 
0.124** 
(0.036) 
0.141** 
(0.031) 
0.190** 
(0.034) 
0.161** 
(0.041) 
0.299** 
(0.032) 
0.399** 
(0.041) 
0.599** 
(0.067) 
0.393** 
(0.089) 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
0.244 
(V) 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.044 
(0.081) 
0.045 
(0.038) 
-0.003 
(0.033) 
0.047 
(0.030) 
0.127** 
(0.036) 
0.142** 
(0.032) 
0.192** 
(0.035) 
0.167** 
(0.041) 
0.307** 
(0.032) 
0.415** 
(0.041) 
0.610** 
(0.068) 
0.417** 
(0.090) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
0.242 
(VI) 
-0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.043 
(0.081) 
0.045 
(0.037) 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
0.121** 
(0.036) 
0.141** 
(0.031) 
0.191** 
(0.035) 
0.165** 
(0.041) 
0.304** 
(0.032) 
0.411** 
(0.041) 
0.612** 
(0.067) 
0.415** 
(0.089) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
0.241 
(VII) 
-0.020 
(0.032) 
-0.054 
(0.081) 
0.048 
(0.037) 
-0.004 
(0.033) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
0.124** 
(0.036) 
0.136** 
(0.032) 
0.186** 
(0.035) 
0.157** 
(0.041) 
0.295** 
(0.032) 
0.391** 
(0.041) 
0.588** 
(0.068) 
0.382** 
(0.090) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
0.247 
Note: see Table 5. 
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A3:OLS Log Earnings Equation Estimates ((1953 Cohort). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Incfependent variables 
EDlold 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3_ 
general 
technical 
EM_ 
general 
technical 
ED5_ 
general 
technical 
ED6_ 
general 
technical 
EE7_ 
general 
technical 
Contois of 
Cointy of 
resdence 
Fanily background 
Intilligence 
tesB 
Aclievement tests 
Mata 
tummies 
ont. var. 
tf-adj 
a> 
-0.039 
(0.038) 
0.129 
(0.103) 
0.049 
(0.041) 
0.028 
(0.023) 
0.037 
(0.020) 
0.107** 
(0.025) 
0.139** 
(0.028) 
0.181** 
(0.024) 
0.250** 
(0.027) 
0.330** 
(0.022) 
0.418** 
(0.031) 
0.629** 
(0.076) 
0.313** 
(0.082) 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
0.182 
(II) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
0.130 
(0.103) 
0.053 
(0.041) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
0.038 
(0.020) 
0.096** 
(0.025) 
0.132** 
(0.028) 
0.174** 
(0.024) 
0.241** 
(0.027) 
0.311** 
(0.023) 
0.395** 
(0.032) 
0.602** 
(0.076) 
0.273** 
(0.083) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
0.192 
an) 
-0.024 
(0.038) 
0.152 
(0.102) 
0.044 
(0.041) 
0.017 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.020) 
0.061* 
(0.026) 
0.122** 
(0.028) 
0.146** 
(0.025) 
0.209** 
(0.027) 
0.275** 
(0.024) 
0.347** 
(0.033) 
0.552** 
(0.076) 
0.225** 
(0.084) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
0.199 
(TV) 
0.003 
(0.041) 
0.149 
(0.102) 
0.065 
(0.044) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
0.034 
(0.020) 
0.052* 
(0.027) 
0.124** 
(0.028) 
0.143** 
(0.025) 
0.199** 
(0.028) 
0.264** 
(0.025) 
0.329** 
(0.034) 
0.537** 
(0.076) 
0.204** 
(0.084) 
yes 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
0.204 
(V) 
-0.014 
(0.044) 
0.151 
(0.102) 
0.063 
(0.044) 
0.017 
(0.024) 
0.032 
(0.021) 
0.052* 
(0.027) 
0.122** 
(0.029) 
0.141** 
(0.026) 
0.198** 
(0.028) 
0.266** 
(0.025) 
0.332** 
(0.034) 
0.550** 
(0.077) 
0.211** 
(0.084) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
0.201 
(VI) 
0.014 
(0.041) 
0.148 
(0.102) 
0.073 
(0.044) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.036 
(0.020) 
0.056* 
(0.027) 
0.126** 
(0.028) 
0.147** 
(0.025) 
0.204** 
(0.028) 
0.268** 
(0.025) 
0.334** 
(0.034) 
0.543** 
(0.076) 
0.209** 
(0.084) 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
0.203 
(VII) 
0.008 
(0.045) 
0.159 
(0.102) 
0.084 
(0.046) 
0.018 
(0.024) 
0.036 
(0.021) 
0.048 
(0.027) 
0.125** 
(0.029) 
0.139** 
(0.026) 
0.197** 
(0.028) 
0.264** 
(0.025) 
0.329** 
(0.034) 
0.544** 
(0.077) 
0.207** 
(0.084) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
0.203 
Note: lee Table 6. 
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A4: Coefficients on family background variables used in column two of Tables 5 and 6. Standard errors in 
parenthesis. 
Family backgrund var-
iables 1948 cohort 1953 cohort 
Family backgrund var-
iables (cont.) 1953 cohort 
Father-educl 
Father-educ2 
Father-educ3 
Father-educ4 
Mother-educl 
Mother-educ2 
Mother-educ3 
Mother-educ4 
Father-occl 
Father-occ2 
Father-occ3 
Father-occ4 
-0.030 
(0.026) 
-0.005 
(0.074) 
0.077* 
(0.037) 
0.039 
(0.076) 
-0.028 
(0.021) 
0.022 
(0.079) 
-0.065 
(0.046) 
0.211* 
(0.102) 
0.002 
(0.064) 
-0.046* 
(0.019) 
-0.064 
(0.076) 
-0.000 
(0.074) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
-0.055 
(0.089) 
0.104** 
(0.033) 
0.262** 
(0.086) 
0.013 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.031) 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
0.100 
(0.118) 
0.073 
(0.073) 
-0.043* 
(0.021) 
-0.127 
(0.083) 
-0.185** 
(0.067) 
Note: see Tables 5 and 6. 
reference group: juior secondary school. 
educl: elementary school. 
educ2: unknown. 
educ3: upper secondary school. 
educ4: post secondary school. 
reference group: workers, 
occl: unknown. 
Father-occ5 
Father-occ6 
Father-occ7 
Father-occ8 
Father-occ9 
Mother-occl 
Mother-occ2 
Mother-occ3 
Mother-occ4 
Mother-occ7 
Mother-occ8 
Mother-occ9 
0.067 
(0.097) 
0.091 
(0.066) 
0.012 
(0.021) 
-0.032 
(0.026) 
0.033 
(0.020) 
0.041* 
(0.017) 
-0.068 
(0.153) 
-0.187 
(0.106) 
-0.021 
(0.063) 
0.067 
(0.071) 
0.053 
(0.053) 
0.022 
(0.032) 
-0.192* 
(0.094) 
0.152** 
(0.052) 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.017 
(0.028) 
0.046* 
(0.020) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
0.154 
(0.322) 
-0.072 
(0.120) 
0.026 
(0.060) 
0.017 
(0.057) 
-0.034 
(0.042) 
-0.003 
(0.031) 
occ2: agriculture and fishermen etc. 
occ3: professionals. 
occ4: elementary school teachers and others. 
occ5: officers. 
occ6: managers and wholesale dealers etc. 
occ7: sales workers and craftsmen. 
occ8: higher grade non manual. 
occ9: white collar. 
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A5: Coefficients on ability variables used in Table 5. Standard errors in parenthesis 
Indepeident variables (III) (IV) (VI) 
Intelligence tests 
Number Series 
Opposite 
Metal foldings 
AchieNement tests 
Reading 
Eiglish 
Mathematics 
Marks 
Svedish 
Eiglish 
Mathematics 
0.037*» 
(0.007) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.025* 
(0.011) 
-0.035** 
*
n ü n
* (0.012) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.061** 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.058** 
(0.008) 
Note: see Table 5. 
Coefficients on measures of ability used in specifications (V) and (VII) 
are avalable from the author upon request. 
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A6: Coefficients on ability variables used in Table 6. Standard errors in parenthesis 
Independent variables an) (IV) (VI) 
Intelligence tests 
Number Series 
Opposite 
Metal foldings 
Achievement tests 
Swedish 
Reading 
Writing 
English 
Mathematics 
Marks 
Swedish 
7 point scale 
5 point scale 
English 
7 point scale 
5 point scale 
Mathematics 
7 point scale 
5 point scale 
0.028** 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.043** 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.065** 
(0.018) 
0.038** 
(0.009) 
Note: see Table 5. 
Coefficients on measures of ability used in specifications (V) and (VII) 
are available from the author upon request. 
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A7: OLS Log Earnings Estimates used in Table 8. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Independent variables 
EDlold 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Intelligence test 
(Number Series) 
Achievement test 
(Mathematics) 
ED 1_* Ability 
old 
new 
ED2old*Ability 
ED3* Ability 
ED4* Ability 
ED5*Ability 
ED6* Ability 
ED7* Ability 
an), av) 
0.098 
(0.086) 
0.080 
(0.287) 
0.277** 
(0.101) 
0.093 
(0.079) 
0.227** 
(0.083) 
0.354** 
(0.091) 
0.348** 
(0.086) 
0.640* 
(0.275) 
0.078** 
(0.030) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.012* 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
1948 cohort 
(VI), (VII 
0.248 
(0.143) 
0.176 
(0.371) 
0.639** 
(0.176) 
0.209 
(0.131) 
0.234 
(0.137) 
0.569** 
(0.151) 
0.328* 
(0.142) 
0.050 
(0.417) 
0.107** 
(0.031) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.015** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
[III), (TV) 
0.072 
(0.102) 
0.296 
(0.230) 
0.029 
(0.123) 
-0.001 
(0.051) 
0.089 
(0.064) 
0.106 
(0.064) 
0.353** 
(0.067) 
0.016 
(0.249) 
0.027 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
1953 cohort 
(VI), (VII 
0.174 
(0.109) 
0.570* 
(0.293) 
0.211 
(0.132) 
0.056 
(0.052) 
0.115 
(0.065) 
0.126 
(0.067) 
0.285** 
(0.070) 
0.108 
(0.316) 
0.054** 
(0.017) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
_old: The old school system. 
_new: The new school system. 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
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A8: Probit analysis. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Independent 
variables 
EDI old 
EDlnew 
ED2old 
ED3 
ED4 
ED5 
ED6 
ED7 
Number Series 
Metal Folding 
Opposite 
Controls of 
County of residence 
1948 cohort1 
(I) 
0.290 
(0.157) 
0.147 
(0.404) 
0.204 
(0.182) 
0.007 
(0.135) 
0.311* 
(0.143) 
0.313* 
(0.156) 
0.715** 
(0.156) 
0.400 
(0.308) 
yes 
OD 
0.305* 
(0.157) 
0.144 
(0.408) 
0.171 
(0.183) 
-0.022 
(0.135) 
0.234 
(0.145) 
0.225 
(0.159) 
0.589** 
(0.163) 
0.225 
(0.316) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
yes 
1953 cohort1 
0) 
0.201 
(0.147) 
-0.652* 
(0.287) 
0.131 
(0.158) 
0.060 
(0.069) 
0.308** 
(0.087) 
0.502** 
(0.089) 
0.773** 
(0.099) 
0.333 
(0.249) 
yes 
i 
(II) 
0.196 
(0.147) 
-0.650* 
(0.286) 
0.120 
(0.158) 
0.058 
(0.069) 
0.289** 
(0.090) 
0.479** 
(0.093) 
0.744** 
(0.105) 
0.284 
(0.252) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
yes 
Notes: 
(1): The sample size is 3655. 
(2): The sample size is 3754. 
_old: The old school system. 
_new: The new school system. 
* Statistically significant from zero at 5 per cent level. 
** Statistically significant from zero at 1 per cent level. 
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